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GEORGE BERKELEY AND MOTOORI NORINAGA ON
OTHER MINDS AND THERE BEING “NOTHING TO BE DONE”
WUNG CHENG CHIM

ABSTRACT: The 18th century Irish philosopher George Berkeley argued that we might
know of the existence of other minds based upon our experience of having certain sense-data
or “ideas” imprinted upon us. This served, for Berkeley, ultimately as a basis for us to know
of a “grand” other mind orchestrating the order among said ideas imprinted upon us, that is,
God. This leap to God, however, has been challenged over the past three decades. A very
rudimentary form could still be retained though from Berkeley’s argument for God, whereby
Berkeley argued that human minds were dependent upon other “more powerful” minds. I shall
open with the contention that Berkeley did not actually show that there must exist one or many
other minds orchestrating the order among imprinted ideas. This contention shall serve as the
ground for speculating what form Berkeleyanism would take, if we posit many other minds
instead of one God. I shall argue that this Berkeleyanism “reworked” on the premise of many
other minds, could understand those ideas imprinted upon us as having been decided by a
commune of finite other minds. I shall also argue that the experience of having ideas imprinted
upon us is identical to an experience the Japanese thinker of the same century, Motoori
Norinaga, expressed with the phrase semusubenaki (“There is nothing to be done”). This
experience of there being “nothing-to-be-done” (Nasusubenaki) shall also be situated within
the Berkeleyanism “reworked” around the premise of a commune of other minds imprinting
ideas upon us to speculative ends.
Keywords: George Berkeley, Motoori Norinaga, problem of other minds

1. INTRODUCTION
I aim to examine here George Berkeley’s treatment of other minds, chiefly that in
passages 28-33, in his Principles of Human Knowledge, in conjunction with a term
used by Motoori Norinaga and analyzed by Sagara Tōru (1978) in his commentaries
on Norinaga, semusubenaki. By the end of this article, I hope to have offered a
preliminary sketch for a “reworking” of Berkeleyanism centered around our relation to
other “more powerful” minds. At the same time, this “reworked” Berkeleyanism would
________________________
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also be a secular one whereby the world is no longer produced and organized by one
God, but by a commune of numerous other minds. I shall further demonstrate a
semblance between Berkeley’s treatment of other minds and the relation prescribed by
Norinaga between human beings and gods, but where Berkeley did not make clear the
exact human experience of our relation to other minds, Norinaga expressed it clearly
with the phrase, “there is nothing to be done” (semusubenashi). I shall thus draw upon
Norinaga to complete this “reworked” Berkeleyanism by identifying the human
experience in our relation to other minds as that of “nothing-to-be-done”
(Nasusubenaki).
It must be noted though that, due to their preoccupations with the divine and its role
in bringing about beings and events in the world, Berkeley and Norinaga’s writings
were intensely religious, often apologetic. Berkeley’s (1967b, 55) treatment of other
minds, especially, took a sharp theological turn and concluded in the existence of
another mind “more powerful” than us. That said, over the past three decades, we have
seen attempts to “secularize” Berkeley, so to speak. Challenges have been posed to
Berkeley’s leap to this other “more powerful” mind in the likeness of God. Two
attempts have been made by Margaret Atherton (1995) and Helen Yetter-Chappell
(2017) in working out a Berkeleyanism without God. Ekaterina Ksenjek and Daniel
Flage (2012) have likewise argued that the passages I would be considering here did
not necessarily force us to acknowledge a God in the singular, much less a JudeoChristian God. Although there was no taking Christianity away from Bishop Berkeley,
we can now see the hope of “secularizing” Berkeleyanism, so to speak. I would like to
take the works of Atherton, Yetter-Chappell, Ksenjek, Flage, among others as my cue
and further rework Berkeley’s treatment of God into a more “secular” treatment of
other minds in general.
To this end, I would like to draw also upon the Shinto-inspired ontology of Motoori
Norinaga. Norinaga, as a thinker, did not enjoy a particularly intimate relation with
others. If we are to look for a treatment of other minds in his writings, we might
immediately find his harsh attacks on what he called “Chinese minds” (karagokoro)1
(see, for one instance, Norinaga 1991, 30 for his contrasting of the minds of the ancient
Japanese and the Chinese). It is certainly an inescapable burden that we would be
confronted with unsavory remarks on ethnic, cultural, etc. others, whilst contending
with 18th century thinkers. Instead of Norinaga’s own treatment of the relations
between ethnic, cultural, etc. others, however, I would like to consider his treatment of
the relations between human beings and gods. This is not only for ease of comparison
with Berkeley. Since Norinaga (1930, 4) believed in ethnic and cultural spheres which
were originally self-contained2, I think it safe for us to think that, for Norinaga, the
1

See also Antoni 2004, for an examination of the treatments of the term “Chinese mind” by other native
studies thinkers, as well as its ties to 20th century fascism in Japan.
2
Norinaga maintained that the significations, events, and expressions of each age and locale was
contained to itself (Motoori 1930, 4). This was the basis by which he chose to commentate on the Kojiki,
instead of the other historical and mythical record, the Nihonshoki, which he held to have been too
dependent on the style of Chinese texts and was, hence, no longer faithful to the events it was meant to
record.
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chief of the other minds, to whom human beings might relate, were not the minds of
human beings outside the sphere, but the native ones shaping the spheres.
Like Berkeley though, Norinaga was not entirely without his “secular” moments.
Sagara Tōru (1978, 54) has argued that Norinaga maintained a divide between the
individual world of poetics and the social world of teachings throughout his life. If we
follow Sagara in arguing so, we may say Norinaga preserved a safety zone for a secular
feudal subject away from the reign and worship (matsurigoto) of the deified monarch
and shoguns acting as proxies of monarchs. In the 21st century, the monogaku (lit. “the
study of things”) movement has also begun using elements of Norinaga’s thoughts in
more secular contexts. For one, the creative deity (or deities) central to Norinaga’s
theology, the Musubi no Kami, has been used by Kamata Tōji (2009, 9) as the name
for a “force” allowing for the interiorization of ordinary objects.3
This article shall aim to offer a completely “secular” reading of both Berkeleyanism
(as presented in Principles of Human Knowledge) and Norinaga’s Shinto cosmology.
Section 2 shall begin by examining passages 28 to 33 from Principles of Human
Knowledge, where Berkeley was said to have not only showed how we derived
knowledge of other minds, but also our knowledge of God. This knowledge of God,
however, has been challenged by Margaret Atherton, Helen Yetter-Chappell, and
Ekaterina Ksenjek and Daniel Flage. By surveying these challenges, I would ease the
way into Section 3 where I would attempt to “rework” the Berkeleyan knowledge of
other minds by emphasizing on Berkeley’s characterization of said minds as being
“more powerful”, after which I would also speculate as to what it would mean to have
numerous other minds at work instead of the singular other mind Berkeley opted for.
Section 4 shall proceed into Motoori Norinaga’s cosmology. I shall argue that Norinaga,
like Berkeley, also placed much emphasis on the experience of having something given
to us and was responding to this experience when he wrote, “There is nothing I can do”
(semusubenashi). In this section, I shall also propose that the expression, “There is
nothing I can do”, must come after a prior experience I shall denote as “nothing-to-bedone” (Nasusubenaki). Section 5 shall also compare Berkeley and Norinaga and argued
that they concurred on the points that something was given to/imprinted upon us; and
that if a being was held responsible for giving to/imprinting upon us something, then
this being must also be “more powerful” than us. This final section would also attempt
to situate the experience of “nothing-to-be-done” within the Berkeleyanism “reworked”
in section 3.

3

I refer to the Musubi no Kami as an element of Norinaga’s thoughts, since Isomae Jun'ichi (2000, 24)
has argued that Norinaga’s interpretation of the Musubi no Kami as “the fundamental source of all beings”
was actually a departure from the Kojiki which Norinaga was interpreting, where the Musubi no Kami
were only names within “an enumeration of the names of kami”. Hence, theologies and cosmologies
where the deities were given prominent roles, and contemporary uses of this deity’s name influenced by
the significance attributed to the deities within said theologies and cosmologies, would have to be traced
back to Norinaga.
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2. BERKELEY: PROBLEMS IN PASSAGE 28-33
OF PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
As regards Berkeley, I would like to focus chiefly on the three passages quoted below
(28-30) from Principles of Human Knowledge where Berkeley derived the knowledge
of other minds from our experience of having ideas imprinted upon us. Subsequent
passages (31-33) would also be referenced, though emphasis would remain on passages
28 to 30 which outlined clearly the sort of perceptual activities undertaken by our minds
and the minds of others. I would begin by considering here the ordinary interpretation
of these passages as a proof to establish the existence of God, after which I would move
on to two challenges posed to this by Margaret Atherton (1995) and Helen YetterChappell (2017), as well as their own reworkings of Berkeleyanism based on the
challenges they posed to Berkeley. However, I shall also note that these two reworkings
did not inquire deeply enough into the causes of the order among imprinted ideas,
which could lead to an incompatibility with our modern sensibilities which would
understand finite minds to also serve a role in shaping the (specifically, natural) world.
This would prompt a turn towards another challenge posed by Ekaterina Ksenjek and
Daniel Flage (2012), which would serve as the basis for my own attempted “reworking”
of Berkeleyanism.
“28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as
I think fit…
“29. When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I
shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my
view…the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some
other will or spirit that produces them…
“30. The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination;
they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as
those which are the effects of human wills often are…the admirable connexion whereof
sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.” (Berkeley 1967b, 54)

From passage 28 to 29, we arrive at knowledge of the existence of some other mind
which we hold to have produced those ideas unaccountable as our own. Passage 30
argues that this other mind must be qualitatively different from and superior to us on
account of the steadiness, order, and coherence of those ideas it imprinted upon us.
Unquoted here, passage 30 also begins to denote “the set rules or established methods,
wherein the mind we depend[ed] on excite[d] in us the ideas of sense” the “Laws of
Nature” (Berkeley 1967b, 54). By passage 33, the other mind exciting ideas in us has
been given the name “Author of Nature” (55). Now since “Author of Nature” has an
affinity with “one of the traditional names of the Judeo-Christian God”, namely,
“Creator of heaven and earth”, while “wisdom” and “benevolence” attributed to this
Author in passage 30 are also among “essential attributes of the Judeo-Christian God”,
these passages have been taken as presenting an argument to establish the existence of
God (Ksenjek and Flage 2012, 285).
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To this common interpretation, we may ask whether it is necessary that we make
the leap to God from the perceived order among ideas imprinted upon us. Margaret
Atherton and Helen Yetter-Chappell both challenged this and put forth reinterpretations
of Berkeleyanism which did away with God. Atherton (1995) argued that the attribution
of the order among ideas to God could be separated from this order among ideas.
Berkeley already contended a year prior to the publication of Principles of Human
Knowledge, in An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, that “we…ma[d]e sense of
our experience because of its regular and orderly…nature”, with this experience also
being understood to be “distinct from and independent of my mind” (Atherton 1995,
243). In New Theory of Vision, however, he already substantiated his contention with
“absolutely no reference to God” (232). The leap to God became a step tagged onto
this pre-established theory of sensory perception and, therefore, omissible. YetterChappell (2017, 69) approached from another angle and argued that the “beliefs,
desires, understanding, intentions” of God were unnecessary to sustaining order among
ideas, and only God’s “sensory experiences” which were “phenomenally unified”, were
required. She then argued that we could not only do away with God’s personalities but
also with God. This would leave us with a “phenomenal unity” which would be
“independent from all finite minds”, but also accessed by all finite minds: a unity
consisting of the experiences of any object “from every possible perspective it might
be viewed from…from every possible sort of perceiver” (Yetter-Chappell 2017, 69).
These two challenges and corresponding reworkings of Berkeleyanism offer us a
glimpse of a secularized Berkeleyanism, but I think it necessary to note that both did
not inquire deeply into the genesis of the imprinted ideas and the order perceived
among them. This is particularly true in Yetter-Chappell’s reworked Berkeleyanism.
Her proposed phenomenal unity was something finite minds could only access, which
was also independent of all these finite minds 4 . This, to my mind, has the risk of
becoming incompatible with our 21st century sensibilities which would assert firmly
that we are responsible for the extreme climate conditions and other symptoms of the
ongoing ecological crisis. Now, of course, we may say here that our influences on the
natural world, however drastic, nevertheless obey certain basic Laws of Nature which
would never bulge regardless of our efforts to change them, hence calling still for a
measure of independence of the natural world from our minds. That said, it is also
undeniable that there exist myriad particular, more complex rules of avian migration,
seasonal weather transitions, etc. which are all susceptible to human and animal 5
activities. Rather than doing away with God but leaving the creator(s) of the natural
world ambivalent, I think we must take a step further by setting up finite other minds
as participants in the production and organization of ideas imprinted upon us. To this
end, I would like to turn to another challenge posed by Ksenjek and Flage to Berkeley’s
inference of God from the perceived order among imprinted ideas, for a hint as to how
to “rework” Berkeleyanism in this direction.
4

This is an inheritance from Berkeley who, as Atherton (1995, 244) noted, held that “the natural world
[wa]s mind-dependent, but independent of any particular mind”.
5
Berkeley held that animals, like humans, likewise had minds, though minds which would render them
“slaves of [their] passions”, unlike the more sophisticated human minds (Charles 2010, 197).

Comparative Philosophy 12.1 (2021)

CHIM

60

Unlike Atherton and Yetter-Chappell’s challenges, Ksenjek and Flage questioned
whether Berkeley even arrived at a conclusion in the Judeo-Christian God at all in the
passages running from 29 to 33. They argued that Berkeley succeeded, at best, only in
showing that “there [wa]s at least one mind other than Berkeley’s” (Ksenjek and Flage
2012, 284-285 italics my own). Berkeley could show for certain neither the definite
existence of one other mind grander than all others, single-handedly producing and
organizing imprinted ideas, nor the existence of an entire host of other minds working
together in the same task of imprinting ideas upon us (286). If Berkeley did make such
a decision between these two options, Ksenjek and Flage (2012, 287) suggested that
Berkeley might have done so by applying Ockham’s Razor, to choose the simpler
explanation where one mind orchestrated the order among ideas, and not many. That
said, there was no textual evidence as to whether such a choice even crossed Berkeley’s
mind (287). This meant, as Ksenjek and Flage (2012, 293) aptly summed up,
“…even though Berkeley argued for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God, and even
though he based his concept of God on Christian doctrine, this d[id] not entail that the
Principles provide[d] a defense of a strictly Christian notion of God.”

If we go further then to strip Berkeley’s argument in passages 28 to 33 of any
affinity with the Judeo-Christian God, we may say that Berkeley concluded in the
following: that there existed “one finite mind…and one other mind of indeterminate
power, although [its] power…[wa]s greater than that of the known finite mind”
(Ksenjek and Flage 2012, 291). This “other mind” also needs not be a mind. So long
as the alternative “works”, that is, these other minds imprint ideas constitutive of this
world upon us and amount to something “more powerful” than our minds, we may say
this host of other minds also serve in capacity as the Authors of Nature. I would like to
take this interpretation by Ksenjek and Flage as my point of departure in my “reworking”
of Berkeleyanism.
3. “REWORKING” BERKELEYANISM FROM PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE: THOSE OTHER MINDS “MORE POWERFUL” THAN ME
Reworking Berkeleyanism is, of course, not a task I can claim to complete here, hence
the quotation marks. The texts by Berkeley under consideration in this article are few
in number, and I hope at best to offer a preliminary sketch of how Berkeleyanism might
be reworked. I shall begin this section with an explanation of what it meant to call
another mind or mind(s) “more powerful” in terms of the passages already quoted (2833), after which I would attempt to propose a Berkeleyanism “reworked” not around a
single other mind but a host of other minds.
First, concerning what it means to call another mind or minds “more powerful” than
my own: This phrase was used by Berkeley (1967b, 55) himself in passage 33 of
Principles of Human Knowledge, to discern between the “thinking substance which
perceive[d]” imprinted ideas and “another and more powerful spirit” imprinting ideas,
with this “power” being expressed in the fact that imprinted ideas, being produced by
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the latter, were “less dependent” on the former. This much, of course, is already selfevident from passage 29 where Berkeley already established that some ideas were
imprinted by us by another mind. Still, we may extract from here that to speak of
another mind as being “more powerful” than our own is to speak of a certain “power”
of this other mind, found in its imprinting of ideas upon us.
Now, obviously, our own minds are not lacking in the power of imprinting ideas
upon others, but those ideas imprinted upon us by these other minds are unique in two
regards: first, imprinted ideas exhibited, as Berkeley (1967b, 54) noted in passage 30,
an orderliness (“a steadiness, order, and coherence…not excited at random”) not to be
found in ideas we excite by ourselves. This sufficed to testify, for Berkeley (54), to “the
wisdom and benevolence of its Author”.
We may say that the “wisdom” and “benevolence” of this other mind imprinting
ideas upon us are testified in the uses we may set imprinted ideas to. For one instance,
the order among imprinted ideas allowed us to learn from prior observations of
successions of ideas. We learnt from experience that “food nourishe[d], sleep
refreshe[d], and fire warm[ed] us” and, with this knowledge, we know to excite ideas
by ourselves “to regulate our actions for the benefit of life”, that is, to eat food for
nourishment, to refresh us with sleep, and to warm ourselves with fire (Berkeley 1967b,
55).
This then brings us to a second difference between ideas imprinted upon us by other
minds and ideas we excited by ourselves: that ideas we excite by ourselves are
derivative of ideas imprinted upon us by other minds. This is also to say that imprinted
ideas constituted the basis for and limits of ideas we might excite by ourselves. The
“practical” uses mentioned above are only examples of this relation between our ideas
and imprinted ones. Berkeley (1967b, 55) drew the following distinction between these
two types of ideas,
“The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things: and
those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly
termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent.”

Imprinted ideas constitute “real things”, whereas the relation of our ideas to these
“real things” is understood to be strictly that of copying and representing. For one, a
chimera, whose existence Berkeley (1967b, 56) granted insofar as we understood ideas
of chimeras to be imagined and not real, would consist of a combination of copies of
imprinted ideas constitutive of animal bodies. It is in this sense that ideas excited by us
are derivative of ideas imprinted upon our senses by some other “more powerful”
mind(s). This is also to say that some other “more powerful” mind(s) laid forth both
the basis and the limits of those ideas we may excite by ourselves. This is the second
meaning of saying that other minds are “more powerful” than our own. The “power”
of other minds does not consist only of a superior “power” in producing and organizing
ideas with an orderliness our minds cannot attain. We call other minds “powerful”,
since we depend on these other minds which have handed down to us the basis and
limits of our own perceptual activities.

Comparative Philosophy 12.1 (2021)

CHIM

62

If we think of the characterization of other minds as “more powerful” in this light,
it might become clear why Ksenjek and Flage (2012, 287) wrote that, if Berkeley were
presented with a choice between one mind orchestrating all imprinted ideas and
numerous other minds, the former would prove the “simpler” option. Suppose we posit
numerous other minds instead of one, we would no longer be certain that those minds
imprinting ideas upon us are wise and benevolent. We would have to speculate instead
on the relations between these numerous other minds and how these relations influence
the ideas which are ultimately imprinted upon us. Would the order among imprinted
ideas be the product of cooperation or competition among these other minds? The same
goes for when we speak of our dependence upon other “more powerful” minds. In
addition to the question already raised concerning the relations among posited other
minds, we must also ask which mind it is that we are depending upon here, all of these
other minds or only a few.
That said, I still think it necessary that we speculate here about the sort of
Berkeleyanism we would have if we posit numerous other minds at work behind
imprinted ideas instead of one. This speculation is, to my mind, necessary in order to
account for our contemporary sensibilities whereby we recognize human and animal
activities (i.e., the activities of finite minds) to hold some influence over the natural
world. I would, specifically then, speculate here about the sort of Berkeleyanism we
would have when we posit numerous finite other minds in the place of a singular Author
of Nature.
Now, of course, Berkeley did not entertain the prospect of a reign of numerous
other minds in Principles of Human Knowledge at all. In passage 30, only one passage
after inferring that some other mind must exist which we might hold accountable for
ideas not our own, Berkeley (1967b, 54) already began referring to the imprinting other
mind as an “Author” in the singular. In order though to begin our speculations on solid
ground, I would nevertheless like to draw upon remarks Berkeley might have made
concerning the interactions between finite minds as a point of departure. To this end, I
would like to look to Berkeley’s political essay entitled Passive Obedience where
Berkeley did just so, though in a chiefly negative light.
In Passive Obedience, we find Berkeley (1967c, 22) establish first that “the general
well-being of all men, of all nations, of all ages of the world” was an end to which
human beings ought to aspire, after which he set up options of how this well-being
might be attained. I am interested here in Berkeley’s objection (1967c, 22) to the first
option he raised, whereby each human being would be allowed “to consult the public
good, and always to do that which to him shall seem, in the present time and
circumstances, most to conduce to it”. To this, Berkeley (22-23) objected that,
“First…to calculate the events of each particular action is impossible; and, though it were
not, would yet take up too much time to be of use in the affairs of life. Secondly… we can
have no sure standard to which comparing the actions of another, we may pronounce them
good or bad, virtues or vices…Every man's particular rule is buried in his own breast,
invisible to all but himself, who therefore can only tell whether he observes it or no.”
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This objection has a strong affinity with Berkeley’s consideration of the “practical”
uses we have for imprinted ideas in passage 31 of Principles of Human Knowledge. In
this passage of the Principles, Berkeley (1967b, 55) spoke of our prior observations of
order among imprinted ideas as affording us “a sort of foresight”. “Foresight”, of course,
is also another way of saying that we knew what “outcome” would come after our
actions (e.g., eating food, followed by the outcome of nourishment). In Passive
Obedience, we may say Berkeley further explored the uses of this foresight in social
life. The foresight of one human mind was limited and could not discern “all the hidden
circumstances and consequences of an action” (Berkeley 1967c, 22). Berkeley (1967c,
23) also expanded upon his treatment of human perception in general and pointed out
that perception would not reveal to us the particular standards for good and bad in
another human mind, these standards being “buried in [the other’s] breast” 6 . He
concluded then that allowing finite human minds to pursue the well-being of humanity
on their own would end in a lack of “harmony or agreement between the actions of
good men”, whereby “the best actions m[ight] be condemned, and the most villainous
me[t] with applause” (Berkeley 1967c, 23). Now, we may say we have discovered here
a hint of Berkeley’s view of the relations among finite minds, at least within a moral
context: the finite faculties of the human mind would make cooperation with one
another difficult, since some ideas and notions (all circumstances and outcomes of all
actions and the particular standards of good and bad) decisive of collective activities
could not be known with our finite faculties.
Berkeley (1967c, 22), therefore, recommended in Passive Obedience the other
option of pursuing the well-being of humanity, by “enjoining the observation of some
determinate, established laws, which, if universally practised, ha[d], from the nature of
things, an essential fitness to procure the well-being of mankind”. Later on, Berkeley
(1967c, 26) also alluded to the formation of institutions which would serve to enforce7
these laws,
6

Anita Avramides (2000, 130) has noted that while Berkeley appeared to have suggested that we might
think, by analogy, of “another mind having similar ideas or notions” as us, but Avramides also noted
that unless Berkeley could back this up with “an empirical claim about the way [our minds] [we]re
similarly constructed, along with some principle to the effect that the same causes produce the same
effects”, Berkeley had no way of using ideas and notions in his mind “as the model for what [wa]s going
on in another’s mind” (132). We may think of Berkeley’s contention that the particular rule dictating
which particular idea would be morally right or wrong was “buried in [another’s] own breast”, was one
of the instances when Berkeley pointed out explicitly the impossibility of knowing the ideas in the minds
of another based on our own ideas. In simultaneity, we must say that Berkeley’s consideration here was
limited only to particular rules of right and wrong in each human mind. Avramides’ critique still applies
here, since Berkeley has not established any empirical claim showing a similar structure in our and others’
minds, but also suggested here that the faculties of each mind would be as limited as the other.
7
I say “enforce” here, since Berkeley (1967c, 24 italics removed) would argue later that these laws were
derived “immediately from the Author of nature himself”, as well as being “stamped on the mind, to be
engraven on the tables of the heart, because they [we]re well known to mankind, and suggested and
inculcated by conscience”. Institutions or, specifically, the government was further held to be “the
principal source under heaven of those particular advantages for the procurement and conservation
whereof several unquestionable moral rules were prescribed to men” (Berkeley 1967c, 27). In other
words, governments served for Berkeley, at best, to “enforce” moral rules already established by God.
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“The miseries inseparable from a state of anarchy are easily imagined. So insufficient is
the wit or strength of any single man, either to avert the evils, or procure the blessings of
life, and so apt are the wills of different persons to contradict and thwart each other, that it
is absolutely necessary several independent powers be combined together, under the
direction…of one and the same will, I mean the Law of the Society.”

This passage might be read in relation to the passage quoted earlier. Those “miseries
inseparable from a state of anarchy” Berkeley referred to here might be understood as
the miseries consequent of human minds pursuing on their own, with their finite
faculties, the well-being of humanity. If this is the case, we may say that the
combination of otherwise independent human minds into “one and the same will” as
“the Law of the Society” was as much a response to the miseries of a state of anarchy
as a response to the finite faculties of human minds which caused those miseries in the
first place. Human minds, which know neither all circumstances and consequences of
their own actions nor the particular standards of good and bad in other minds, cannot
be allowed to freely excite ideas on their own. Hence, these minds must be gathered
together into an institution which would enforce laws to be followed by every mind
involved in, or (in the case of a government) subordinated to, this institution.
Here I think we may transplant this progression from “a state of anarchy” into
governmental rule from Passive Obedience into our reworked Berkeleyanism. I have
noted already that Berkeley’s own objection to trusting finite minds to pursue universal
well-being on their own, had an affinity with Berkeley’s (1967b, 55) discussion of
“foresight” in passage 31 in Principles of Human Knowledge. The limited “foresight”
and finite faculties of human minds in general cause those “miseries” Berkeley
associated with “a state of anarchy”. It would follow then the institutions formed from
a state of anarchy are meant to “overcome” the finitude of human minds. This
“overcoming” of finite faculties is achieved by enforcing pre-existent moral laws. That
is to say, these institutions are responsible for producing and sustaining a certain order
among ideas constitutive of our actions and outcomes of said actions, in obedience to
pre-existent laws. These institutions served to prevent the miseries of anarchy whereby
“the best actions may be condemned, and the most villainous me[t] with applause”
(Berkeley 1967c, 23). In other words, these institutions served in a similar capacity as
those other minds imprinting ideas upon us: they sustained order among ideas. That
said, this order among ideas is given already and the institutions, much like particular
finite minds, can never hope to surpass this order by setting up its own. More concretely,
we may say that these institutions enforce the pre-existent order among ideas by
establishing particular rules. Basic moral laws, such as “’Thou shalt not forswear
thyself’, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery’, ‘Thou shalt not steal’”, do not come with
specific penalties, such as the jailtime the transgressor would have to serve, the manner
of execution, among others (Berkeley 1967c, 26). All these would have to be supplied
by those institutions enforcing these moral laws in particular rules.
This, to my mind, is a suitable framework within which we may begin speculating
on the sort of Berkeleyanism we would be left with if we posit numerous finite other
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minds imprinting ideas upon us instead of one. What Berkeley has spoken of finite
minds in general would be applied here on finite other minds8.
We may begin by positing, like those moral laws Berkeley posited, basic Laws of
Nature, such as the laws of motion, thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, etc. which
all finite other minds would be subjected to. We would take these Laws as brute facts
so as not to call upon a God, gods, or some other mind(s) existent prior and superior to
all finite minds to account for these Laws. The finite other minds living in conformity
to Laws of Nature would form communes analogous to institutions enforcing moral
laws, but these communes of finite other minds do not so much enforce the Laws of
Nature as to, simply, make up for the finitude of one another’s faculties. Particular rules
are forwarded within these communes. Examples of these rules might be found in
mutualistic and parasitic relations between humans and humans, animals and animals,
human and animals. The cooperation between dogs, sheep, and shepherds operates by
particular rules dictating that if the dogs do not attack, or harass in some other way, the
sheep, the shepherds would not retaliate; and if the dogs go one step further to help
guard the sheep, the shepherds would reward the dogs for their services. Since these
particular rules are established by communes of human and animal minds, these
particular rules are also susceptible to human and animal activities, even by the
activities of those minds outside of the original communes which decided upon those
rules. The historical domestication of sheep for wool and meat disrupted particular rules
established prior between sheep and other undomesticated animals. The subsequent
domestication of dogs as guards for the sheep and, later on, as pets also served to further
disrupt pre-established rules. For another, we may look to human carbon emissions
which aggravate global warming and, therefore, also disrupt the particular rules of
avian migration set to take place under specific temperatures, weather conditions, etc.
The totality of ideas excited by finite other minds in conformity to these particular rules
and the Laws of Nature amounts to what we call the “natural world”
These finite other minds or, rather, the communes they form, therefore, serve in
capacity as the “Author of Nature”. Unlike the original “Author” in Berkeley’s
Principles of Human Knowledge where there was posited one mind “grander”, “more
powerful” than others, however, we must say here that each finite other mind is no
8

See note 6 which has considered already Anita Avramides’ critique of Berkeley for not justifying the
similarity he presumed between our and others’ minds, and how it might also pertain to Berkeley’s
reference to finite faculties of human minds in Passive Obedience. Hence, when I applied what Berkeley
has spoken of finite human minds to finite other minds, I must confess to have presupposed, as Berkeley
did in Passive Obedience, similar structures to our and others’ minds. I can only defend this on two
regards: first, that Berkeley’s treatments of the relations between finite minds were premised upon this
presupposed similar structure of mind and, hence, it is still functionally necessary to working within and
expanding upon these relations between finite minds. Second, by the end of this section, I would show
that it is the commune of these other minds which decides upon what ideas were imprinted upon our
senses, such that whatever relations there are among these other minds are far less important than the
“final decision” reached by these minds. Hence, the presupposed similarity in structure of finite minds
is actually functionally insignificant, in that it does not have any actual impact on the conception of our
experiences of having ideas imprinted upon us by “some” other mind(s), nor our dependence upon those
ideas and those indeterminate “other minds” doing the imprinting.
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more or less “powerful” than us. After all, if not for their limited foresights and finite
faculties in general, they would not have gathered into communes. It is the communes
themselves to which we must attribute the power over us; that the communes are what
are “more powerful” than us, not each finite other mind. We may think of our relations
to these communes as analogous to our relations to parliamentary and other
governmental bodies. Policies are devised through the collective efforts of those other
minds working within these bodies and handed down to us. These policies, informed
by the perceptions of the interests of multiple communities, would exhibit an
“orderliness” or, at least, contain convoluted calculations of interconnecting interests
which we cannot hope to complete by ourselves. These policies also organize those
ideas constitutive of the basis for and the limits of our activities: our annual spending
calculated in terms of the taxes demanded of us by governmental communes, our
pursuits of pleasures limited in terms of what is legal, etc.
In a word, I have defined in this section, first, the meaning of calling another mind
“more powerful” than us in the following way: first, the power of this mind or minds
to produce and organize ideas into an order our own minds could not attain; and, second,
the power to produce ideas which we must depend upon, as the basis and limits of our
own perceptual activities. Second, I have speculated that if we are to posit in
Berkeleyanism numerous other minds imprinting ideas upon us rather than one, then
we may think of these numerous other minds as working in communes and establish
particular rules dictating their own actions based on certain basic Laws of Nature. I
have noted also that, under this “reworked” Berkeleyanism, we must characterize the
communes as the ones which are “more powerful” than us, not particular finite other
minds.
4. NORINAGA: NOTHING-TO-DO (SEMUSUBENAKI)
AND NOTHING-TO-BE-DONE (NASUSUBENAKI)
As regards Motoori Norinaga, I would like to focus on Norinaga’s treatment of the
relation between a human and a god, with an emphasis on the term semusubenaki. Prior
to this though, I would like to offer a brief overview of Norinaga’s equivalent of
Berkeley’s other “more powerful” mind (or the “Author of Nature”), i.e., Norinaga’s
“gods” (kami). This would serve to establish, preliminarily, an alliance between
Norinaga’s Shinto-inspired cosmology and the “reworked” Berkeleyanism proposed in
the previous section. In his forty-four-volume commentaries on the historical and
mythical records, the Kojiki, Norinaga (1930, 140) wrote the following,
“...from the gods of heaven and earth found in the ancient chronicles, to those whose august
spirits are enshrined in shrines, to human beings, birds, insects, trees, and grass the seas
and the mountains…any being which is not common of this world, in possession of
superior quality, and which inspires awe is called a god.”
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If our aim here is introduce or, even, promote Norinaga’s theology, we may
certainly use this “functionalist”9 definition of a “god” as a gimmick. Since our aim
here is secular, however, we may exploit this loose definition of a “god” to convert
Norinaga’s “gods” simply into “other ‘more powerful’ beings”, though not in the same
sense as I have defined it in the previous section, since Norinaga’s definition here
referred to properties of those other beings themselves. In any case, we may still look
to Norinaga’s other remarks on his “gods” in a similar light. When Norinaga (1991, 31)
held that “[e]verything in Heaven and Earth [wa]s in complete accordance with the will
of the Gods”, we may think of this as referring to the overlapping creative activities of
these other “more powerful” beings, be it a human being holding socio-political power
or a pack of wolves raiding human settlements, which culminated in every being and
event in this world.
Norinaga referred to these creative activities by various terms, but, for
terminological consistency, I would refer to these activities simply as “giving”
(tamau)10. Now, these givings of beings and events by other “more powerful” beings
were not always concomitant with one another. Norinaga believed in benign as well as
malevolent “gods”, as well as disparities of power among these beings 11 . Without
delving into mythical accounts, we may say that Norinaga recognized conflicting
natures in those other “more powerful” beings he posited, which would give way to
9

This description of Norinaga’s definition of a “god” was made by Ueda Kenji (2000).
Tamau is not a term unique to Norinaga’s writings at all. Norinaga (1930, 345) himself acknowledged
that the word tamau could be used as “a mere word expressing worship” (agamekotoba). For the purpose
of this paper, I refer to the use of tamau (as both verb and auxiliary verb) to refer, from the standpoint
of someone of inferior standing, to a gesture from someone of superior standing in general, not only the
gods. That said, under Norinaga’s cosmology, “superiors” often coincided with the divine. The emperor
of Japan was held to be a god, while the Tokugawa shogunate under which Norinaga lived was
understood to rule Japan by the grace of the emperor and blessing of the gods (Motoori 1988, 55).
Norinaga (1930, 56) also held that the professions each family took up were mere inheritances of the
professions of these families’ ancestral gods (oyakami). The relation of tamau in Norinaga to the divine
(or other “more powerful” beings) resembled the relation of Berkeley’s imprinting to God (another
“more powerful” mind). “imprinting”. That said, Norinaga being neither a rigorous empiricist nor an
immaterialist like Berkeley, tamau clearly could not have been conceived, like “imprinting”, as the
giving of sensory ideas specifically.
The diverse accounts Norinaga provided of “giving” also complicated its meaning further. For one, in
relation to the creation deities, the Musubi no Kami, Norinaga (1930, 146) used the term nariizuru (“to
produce”, also “to give birth to”) to refer to their activities. He then cited, as examples of the “giving”
of these gods at work, not only those beings and events brought about directly by these deities, but also
myths where their offspring were involved. While we may understand this simply as Norinaga exploiting
two meanings of nariizuru, he also made difficult a philosophical analysis of this term. Are we to think
of the doings of a being’s offspring as the doings of the parent itself? Was Norinaga allowing for a direct
“secondary” cause (the offspring) to the indirect “primary” cause (the Musubi no Kami)? In any case,
we may say that, unlike Berkeley who narrowed down the meaning of “imprinting”, Norinaga’s sense

10

of “giving” was far more ambivalent.
11

The sun goddess, Amaterasu no Ōmikami, which was also held to be the progenitor to the imperial
family, was understood to be a god without whose favor “[n]o country c[ould] exist for a moment”
(Motoori 1988, 47). Other gods were also entered into hierarchy after the sun goddess, with exceptional
cases of “evil gods” whose malicious creative acts could attain an intensity even the sun goddess and
other benign gods could not suppress (Motoori 1991, 33).
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cooperation or competition among these beings. If this is the case, we may say that
these other “more powerful” beings operated within a “commune” of their own. This
“commune” though would be distinct from the “commune” of finite other minds I
spoke of in the previous section, which was established by finite minds to overcome
their finite faculties. While, to be sure, Norinaga’s “gods” did band together and
operated in cooperation or competition, Norinaga would certainly yield to mythical
accounts of the causes of why these beings gathered in the first place. Since he also
defined these beings by their being uncommon, superior qualities, and power to inspire
awe in us, it is dubious that he would allow for the characterization of the commune as
that which was “more powerful” than us, and not the particular members of this
commune instead. That said, Norinaga would still be partially agreeable to our
“reworked” Berkeleyanism, if only on the fact that the world and the beings and events
within are the results of overlapping and, sometimes, conflicting activities of beings
other than us, which culminates in an orderliness we cannot hope to produce with our
own finite powers, upon which we depend for the basis and limits of our own activities.
At the same time, Norinaga’s disagreement with us would consist of disagreements on
the specific properties of those other beings whose activities culminated in our world
and the beings and events within. This point of disagreement though does no harm to
Norinaga’s agreement with us. Whether we exalt each particular other being for being
“more powerful” than us or exalt the commune of all other beings, the commune of
other beings deciding upon the world and the beings and events within still stands.
Hence, in addition to the alliance I shall establish between Bishop Berkeley and
Norinaga, there exists also another alliance between my “reworked” Berkeley and
Norinaga. I shall have cause to return to this at the end of this paper, but would like,
for the moment, to let this alliance rest as it is.
Now, I would like to take a step back to Berkeley, specifically his account of our
own experience of having this very world given to, or in Berkeley’s terminologies,
“imprinted upon” us. This would serve to draw out a major difference between
Berkeley and Norinaga’s treatment of other “more powerful” beings and minds not to
be overlooked. Berkeley’s example for imprinting can be found in passage 29 of
Principles of Human Knowledge, where Berkeley (1967b, 54) spoke of how, when we
opened our eyes in the day, it was “not in [our] power[s] to choose whether [we] shall
see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to [our]
view[s]”. Similar examples of beings and events being given to us in certain preestablished forms could also be found in Norinaga (1930, 9; italics my own),
“If you cleanse yourself of the heart corrupted by Chinese teachings and think carefully,
you would realize that heaven and earth is merely heaven and earth, men and women is
merely men and women, water and fire is merely water and fire. Though there is a certain
form spontaneously attached to them, all of this is merely the doings of the gods. Therefore,
any principle underpinning these forms must be miraculous and mysterious things, and not
something human beings might know well.”

This passage was written in opposition to the application of principles of yin, yang, and
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the five elements to the Kojiki, but this passage also offered us a glimpse of Norinaga’s
view that beings and events nevertheless were structured by others in a certain way.
Unlike Berkeley though, Norinaga did not take this order among beings and events as
his point of departure to infer that some other being or mind must exist which has
produced this given order. If anything, it is not implausible that Norinaga would
consider this inference a sign of “a heart corrupted by Chinese teachings”, which would
dare to account for the “doings of the gods” with human intellect. Norinaga (1930 4)
also held that historical and mythical records such as the Kojiki were text unadulterated
by Chinese meanings and, therefore, an authentic historical document, however
outlandish its mythico-historical accounts might be. When the Kojiki spoke of the gods,
their doings, and those descended from the gods, all of it would have to be taken to be
true. Hence, Norinaga would have little to no cause in the first place to seek to establish
further proof for the existences of the gods, and he might begin easily by simply taking
the existences of the gods for granted. In other words, we may say that while Norinaga
held, like Berkeley, that some manner of order was to be found among beings and
events in the world, and this order was attributable to beings other and “more powerful”
than us, he neither justified (logically) the leap to these other beings, nor moved further
from this to infer anything concerning these other beings.
Did Norinaga offer us any other way of “knowing” the activities of these other
“more powerful” beings? I would like to argue that, in the preface to the Kojiki-den
entitled Naobi no Mitama, Norinaga offered just such a way. Since Norinaga held all
beings and events to have been brought about by the “doings of the gods”, it should be
no surprise that even calamities and misfortunes, in general, would also be attributed
to other “more powerful” beings and, specifically, malicious ones. In the preface to the
Kojiki, Norinaga wrote the following concerning our relation to certain other “more
powerful” beings which were malicious: “To our sorrow, nothing can be done
[semusubenaku] about the violent perturbations of the evil Gods of Magatsubi”
(Motoori 1991, 33).
This might appear a fairly insignificant remark blaming calamities and misfortunes
on some evil force, but Sagara Tōru (1978) also saw the phrase “nothing can be done”
as integral to Norinaga’s thoughts. In fact, Sagara went so far as to make the phrase the
title of the last division to his commentaries on Norinaga. The phrase itself became a
hint for Sagara (1978, 209-223) to extract a “double structure” from Norinaga’s
writings: Norinaga’s personal yearnings for a return to native Japanese roots were
pitted against the customs in his lifetime which were heavily influenced by the foreign,
especially Chinese, teachings. Sagara (1978, 223) argued that Norinaga resolved this
opposition by submitting to these customs, while still holding onto the hope that “the
fruits of his studies would be realized one day by the hands of those superior to him in
standing”.
Now, this treatment of the phrase “nothing can be done” (semusubenaki) was
heavily influenced by Sagara’s mentor, Watsuji Tetsurō, to which Sagara (1978, ix)
admitted implicitly when he wrote that he was interested in “Norinaga the ningen” and
the ethical thinking of Norinaga. Here, in this paper, however, I would like to consider
the phrase semusubenaki more “literally”, so to speak. While Sagara would have
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translated “gods” and those beings and events said “gods” gave into “social reality”, I
would translate the former only as “other ‘more powerful’ beings” and preserve the
latter as it is.
Concerning the term semusubenaki itself, semu in semusubenaki is the modified
form of su (roughly, “to do”). If we take it to express volition, then the most literal
translation of semusubenaki would be "There is nothing I can think of doing", like an
exclamation in a helpless situation. That said, it is also more than a “mere” exclamation.
As we see in the remark in Naobi no Mitama where Norinaga (1991, 33) used this term,
it is an exclamation coming after the experience of receiving certain beings and events
from other “more powerful” beings, about which we could do nothing, hence giving
way to the exclamation, “There is nothing I can do!” This, we may say after Sagara, is
a crux of Norinaga’s thoughts. We certainly see this confirmed in an unflattering
comparison Norinaga (1988, 58) made of human beings to puppets,
“Let us say that the deities are like men and sacred matters are like the acts of men…let us
say that humans are like puppets, and secular matters are like the movements of the puppets.
These puppets have heads, arms, and legs, and their various movements occur because in
actuality men manipulate them.” 12

Instances of when human beings became analogous to puppets could be found not
only in Norinaga’s own experience of being a native studies thinker in a Japan heavily
influenced by foreign teachings he had no hope of doing away with. In the case of
events such as earthquakes, outbreaks, wars waged between nations, there is equally
nothing for us to do (Nasusubenaki) which would not already have been done and
completed by other “more powerful” beings. This holds true for Norinaga, as for us,
whether we could think of something to do ourselves (semusube) or not. All of these
were neatly summed up when Norinaga (Motoori, cited in Sagara 1978 234) wrote that
“the becoming [naru], performance and completion [nasaru] of events were affairs
human beings could not attain with their powers”.
In other words, Norinaga’s term semusubenaki could be understood as an
expression of his recognition of a prior experience whereby everything was given by
other “more powerful” beings, leaving nothing for him to do or complete with his own
powers. I would like to denote this prior experience as Nasusubenaki (literally, “there
is nothing to do”). Nasusubenaki may be understood in relation to Berkeley’s theory of
perception, as an experience which precedes the expression semusubenaki in
succession. Nasusubenaki corresponds to a human experience which we perceive but
not strongly. It is an ongoing experience consisting of us passively receiving from other
“more powerful” beings successions of beings and events. So long as we perceive with
our senses or are involved, in general, with something we cannot account for as our
own creations, we are in the midst of the experience of Nasusubenaki. Semusubenaki,
12

Sagara (1978, 231-236) also discussed this passage and made a point of arguing that this passage
should not be read as a sign of determinism in Norinaga’s thoughts (231)—an understandable move,
since reading Norinaga as a determinist would undermine the dimension of the individual which Sagara
aimed to preserve and hold in a triune opposition to “reality” and “reason” (ix).
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on the other hand, is an expression we use in response to very specific instances when
the beings and events given are calamitous or contrary, in some measures, to habits we
have formed, such as earthquakes, wars, outbreaks, and personal misfortunes. In these
instances, we recognize that there is nothing we might do before the given calamities
with our own powers and are thus compelled to say, “There is nothing I can do
(semusubenashi)!”
For ease of reading, I shall also hereafter translate the expression semusubenashi
hereafter simply as “nothing-to-do” and the experience nasusubenaki as “nothing-tobe-done”.
5. BERKELEY AND NORINAGA: AN ALLIANCE IN HAVING NOTHING
TO BE DONE; NORINAGA AND THE “REWORKED” BERKELEY
As a way of concluding this paper, I would like to open here with a comparison of
Berkeley and Norinaga, after which I would move on to more speculative remarks on
an alliance between the “reworked” Berkeleyanism presented in section 3 and Norinaga.
We may note first that both Berkeley and Norinaga emphasized on the experience
of having certain beings and events or ideas given to oneself, which were ordered in a
certain way and also served to lay the foundation and limits for one’s subsequent
activities. This experience, however, was not a point of departure in Norinaga for
further demonstrations concerning those other “more powerful” beings which gave
beings and events to us. This sets Norinaga apart from Berkeley whose argument for
another “more powerful” mind depends upon this experience as its empirical basis, as
we have seen in passage 29 of Principles of Human Knowledge. Where Berkeley aimed
to argue causally for the existences of some other “more powerful” mind(s), Norinaga
simply presupposed the existences of other “more powerful” beings. Consequently, the
treatments of the human experience of given beings, events, and ideas by Berkeley and
Norinaga also differ. For Norinaga, since the existences of the other “more powerful”
beings were already presupposed, this experience of having beings and events given to
oneself (“nothing-to-be-done”) was thought on the basis of these presupposed other
beings. This rendered Norinaga the exact opposite of Berkeley. Irrespective though of
their approaches to other minds and beings and human experience, they nevertheless
concluded in similar ontological frameworks whereby there must exist, other and
“more powerful” than us, certain minds or beings.
Their agreement over the existences of other “more powerful” minds or beings is
also bound up with another agreement of theirs over the “natures” of that experience
where we receive beings, events, and ideas from other minds or beings. I have already
spoken in the previous section of this experience as that of there being “nothing-to-bedone” (Nasusubenaki). Within Norinaga’s writings, we see this experience illustrated
chiefly through its relation to the expression, “There is nothing I can do
(semusubenashi)!”, elicited only when given beings and events are contrary to our
interests. Within Berkeley’s writings, however, we find a more ordinary example. In
passage 29 of Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley (1967b, 54) cited the
everyday experience of opening our eyes in daylight and pointed out the obvious here:
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that it was never “in [our] power[s] to choose whether [we] shall see or no, or to
determine what particular objects shall present themselves to [our] view[s]”. However
self-evident this might appear to be, it is worth noting that Berkeley, like Norinaga,
emphasized upon the lack of power to “choose” and “determine” what was imprinted
upon our senses. It is certainly not inconceivable that this same lack of power, in the
case of ideas far more contrary to our interests, would itself become a cause for
suffering and elicit from Berkeley, as from Norinaga, the exclamation of “There is
nothing I can do!” We may think then of the experience of opening our eyes in daylight
as one of the exemplary experiences of “nothing-to-be-done”: the calm and, even,
inconspicuous receiving of ideas from some other “more powerful” minds, sometimes
interrupted by exclamations of “There is nothing I can do!” when we come across a
dead squirrel on the road or a car accident.
In a word, Berkeley and Norinaga concurred on the following two points:
1. That we are constantly receive certain beings, events, and ideas given to or
imprinted upon us by other beings or minds. These beings, events, and ideas are ordered
in a certain way and constitute the basis and limits of our activities. There is also
nothing we might do in relation to these beings, events, and ideas.
2. If said beings, events, and ideas are given to us by another being or mind, this
other being or mind must be “more powerful” than us. “More powerful” here means,
first, that these other beings or minds are responsible for the production of the order
among beings, events, and ideas we cannot hope to accomplish with our own limited
powers; and, second, that we depend upon those beings or minds for the basis and limits
of our own activities.
On the issue of other minds and beings, and our relations to said minds and beings,
I suspect it would be difficult to push for further semblance between the original
Berkeley and Norinaga. To do so would require us to look into the properties Berkeley
and Norinaga attributed to other minds and beings, which would not only enter us into
theology, but also compel us to navigate historical, cultural, etc. relations between
Judeo-Christian monotheism and Shinto polytheism. That said, Margaret Atherton and
Helen Yetter-Chappell have shown that the Judeo-Christian God could be done away
with from Berkeleyanism. Ekaterina Ksenjek and Daniel Flage have also shown that
Berkeleyanism was “open-ended” when it came to the question of other minds. If those
two points of agreement between Berkeley and Norinaga I have listed above do not
posit, unbeknownst to me, any property of other minds and beings other than those
knowable to us in the experience of “nothing-to-be-done”, then we may say that we are
standing now at the same brink Berkeley stood on in passage 29 of Principles of Human
Knowledge. We know that there exist “some other will or spirit that produces” those
beings, events, and ideas unaccountable as our own and constitutive of this world. We
remain at liberty to choose between another mind in the singular orchestrating all
imprinted ideas, and numerous other minds.
In choosing the latter then, we would find ourselves thrown back to section 3 of
this paper and the Berkeleyanism “reworked” in that section. I have also noted in the
opening of section 4 that Norinaga would be partially agreeable to our “reworked”
Berkeleyanism on the positing of a commune of other minds or beings, while
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disagreeing with us on the specific properties of these other beings. I have noted also
that Norinaga’s disagreement with us could do no harm to where he would agree with
us, since the commune of other minds or beings would still stand irrespective of our
speculations into the properties of its members. This means that the experience of
having ideas imprinted upon us, or beings and events given to us—that is, the
experience of “nothing-to-be-done”—likewise still stands. Therefore, we may also
retrofit the two points Berkeley and Norinaga agreed over into the Berkeleyanism we
have “reworked” by positing communes of numerous finite other minds imprinting
ideas upon us in the place of a singular mind.
We may now say, in this “reworked” Berkeleyanism, as we have with the original
Berkeley and Norinaga, that that there is nothing we can do before those “more
powerful” communes of finite other minds which pass down to us particular rules.
These particular rules and the imprinted ideas obeying these rules form the basis and
limits of our activities which we may neither do without nor transcend.
This much would already be obvious, and it is here that Norinaga’s clarification of
the experience of ideas imprinted upon us as “nothing-to-be-done” would compel us to
look at our relation to these communes of other minds or beings in a new light. If
previously we have accepted our lack of power in choosing whether we can see or not
and what objects we see without much thought, this lack of power now stands out as
something prevalent in every moment of our being. We find ourselves in constant
subordination to other “more powerful” minds or beings. Even in a secular age such as
ours, finite other minds, formerly our kin in the shared finitude of our faculties, would
set themselves up as small despots within institutions of their own and unfold a
dictatorship over us which goes unnoticed except when their decisions begin to cut into
our livelihoods. For one instance, we may consider our relations to corporations and
governments whose members might have contributed extensively to aggravating
ongoing ecological, financial, political, etc. crises., about which we can do scarcely
anything. Worse yet, those decisions made by these communes also form the basis and
limits for our own activities and enter us into complicity with the very communes
whose decisions we have no sway over. We are plunged then into a circle of escalating
miseries with no hope of leaving via our own finite powers. The rights still reserved for
us appear to only be that of expressing our despair with the cry, “There is nothing I can
do!”, or to hope, optimistically, that those communes would be reformed from within
by some finite other mind.
A question might now also present itself: if both a Berkeleyanism which posits a
singular divine other mind and a commune of finite other minds leave us equally with
nothing to be done, should we not begin to look for an alternative which makes do
without establishing between us and other minds or beings an unreconcilable disparity
of power? We may begin to question, for one, the progression Berkeley (1967c, 26)
posited in Passive Obedience from a state of anarchy to the formation of institutions13:
13

Berkeley (1967c, 32) has defended this progression by claiming that human minds had “a natural
tendency or disposition to a social life”, which was also what “necessarily result[ed] from the differences
which distinguish man from beast”.
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what if we attempt to conceive of a Berkeleyanism centered, first and foremost, around
this original state of anarchy and not its dissolution under institutions? Or, even, more
radically still, a Berkeleyanism which refuses altogether to move beyond the state of
anarchy? Would this place us back on equal footing with finite other minds, each being
as short-sighted as the other? To be sure though, this question and this alternative,
among many other alternatives we may still propose, all lie beyond the scope of this
essay.
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